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Abstract 
This paper presents an account of the main economic developments in the Iranian 
economy over the period of the First Five-Year Economic, Social and Cultural 
Development Plan (1989/90-1993/94) of the Islamic Republic, provides an overall 
evaluation, and examines the objectives and economic rationales behind the Second Five- 
Year Economic, Social and Cultural Development Plan (covering the period o 1995/96- 
1999/2000) which has been recently approved by the Majlis (the Consultative Assembly 
the Islamic Republic). The emphasis of the paper will be on government's stabilization of 
and liberalization programs, rather than the structural details of the plans. 
./M ) 
. . / 
Planning and Macroeconomic Stabilization in Iran 
By 
M Hashem Pesaran 
Trinity College, Cambridge 
Introduction 
The ending of the Iran-Iraq war in August 1988 signalled the beginning of a new phase 
in the development of the Iranian economy, and presented Mr. Ralsanjani's newly elected 
government with an important opportunity to regenerate the Iranian economy, and to reverse the 
deteriorating trends of the previous decade. Over the period 1978-1988, the real output and 
investment fell by annual average rates of 1.8 and 6.6 per cents, respectively, while the total real 
consumption expenditures had remained largely stagnant, with population growing at around 3.2 
to 3.9 per cent per annum.1 These adverse economic conditions were largely due to the 
revolutionary upheavals, the freezing of the country's foreign assets, economic sanctions, the 
costly and protracted eight-year war with Iraq, the influx of almost 2 million Afghan and 1 
million Iraqi refugees, sharp reduction of oil production and a highly volatile international oil 
market. But they were further exacerbated by extensive nationalization, continued uncertainties 
over the role of the private sector in the economy, centralized and inward-looking government 
policies aimed at maintaining a highly over-valued official exchange rate through import 
compression, foreign exchange restrictions and generally interventionist economic policies with 
far reaching implications for resource allocations, particularly in the financial and industrial 
sectors. The result had been an economy in a state of acute disequilibrium with highly distorted 
price signals, and an ever widening gap between the official and the black (or market 
exchange rates.2 It was clear that the economic policies of the previous decade could not be 
continued, and a new approach to the management of the economy was needed. 
The First Five Year Economic, Social and Cultural Plan, covering the period 1989/90 to 
1993/94, represented the regime's manifesto for the reconstruction of the economy, and provided 
an important framework within which the government's reform and liberalization policies could 
be implemented. This paper presents an account of the main economic developments over the 
period of the First Plan, provides an overall evaluation, and examines the objectives and 
economic rationales behind the Second Five-Year Plan which has been recently approved by the 
Majlis (the Consultative Assembly of the Islamic Republic). The emphasis of the paper will be 
on government's stabilization and liberalization programs, rather than the structural details of 
the Plans. 
The First Five-Year Plan 
This Plan was formally approved by the Majlis in January 1990 and was the result of 
years of negotiations and compromise, which was made possible only after the cessation of 
hostilities with Iraq. The primary aim of the Plan was to regenerate the economy, carry out the 
reconstruction of the war-damaged regions, promote private investment, and initiate a reform 
and liberalization programme primarily aimed at foreign exchange and trade policies. The 
overall target of the First Plan was to achieve an annual average growth of 8.1 per cent in real 
GDP, 11.6 per cent in real investment, and an annual average growth of 5.7 per cent in real 
private consumer expenditures. Another important quantitative objective of the Plan was to 
stabilize the economy's rate of monetary expansion to an average annual rate of 9.4 percent, and 
reduce the rate of inflation from 28.9 per cent in 1988/89 (1367) to an annual average rate of 
15.7 per cent over the duration of the Plan.3 
The breakdown of the Plan's growth objectives by the main sectors of the economy 
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together with the associated realized growth rates are given in Table 1. Under the Plan, real 
output has increased by an annual average rate of around 7.1 per cent, which is only slightly 
below the Plan's overall target (at 8.1 per cent). The situation is different, however, when one 
considers the growth performance of individual sectors in particular years. For example, while 
actual average growth rates under the Plan for the agriculture, oil and service sectors are 
generally in line with those envisaged in the Plan, the same is not true of the other, mainly 
industrial and construction sectors. The average annual growth rates of value added in industries 
and mines, and construction were below their target values by 6.2 and 9.2 per cents, respectively, 
while the growth of value added in water, electricity and gas sector (at 12.7 per cent) exceeded 
the Plan's target by 3.6 per cent. These discrepancies are even more pronounced once attention 
is focused on particular years. There is a clear tendency for the actual growth rates to exceed the 
target rates over the years 1990/9 1 and 199 1/92, and then significantly fall short of the planned 
rates over the last two years of the Plan. The high growth achieved during the first half of the 
Plan largely reflects the initial effects of the trade and foreign exchange liberalizations and the 
utilization of unused capacities in the economy, and was accompanied by an unprecedented 
surge in private consumption expenditures. With the removal of trade and foreign exchange 
restrictions private consumption expenditures at constant prices which had shown only a modest 
growth of around 2.5 per cent in 1989/90, grew by the staggering rates of 19.5 and 9.5 per cents 
over the years 1990/91 and 199 1/92, respectively, followed by more moderate rates of 5.1 and 
2.6 per cents for the last two years of the Plan. (see Table 2). A similar pattern can also be seen 
in investment growth. Over the years 1990/9 1 and 199 1/92 gross fixed capital formation at 
constant prices rose by 13.3 and 40.9 per cents, respectively, while during the last two years of 
the Plan real investment grew by 7.1 per cent in 1992/93 and is estimated to have grown only 
by 0.6 per cent in Over the course of the Plan real private consumption expenditures 
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rose by an annual average rate of 7.9 per cent which is well in excess of the Plan's annual 
average target of 5.7 percent. In contrast, the average growth of real investment was in line with 
the Plan's target, although once again there are important discrepancies between the actual and 
planned investment growths over the different years of the Plan. Public sector consumption 
expenditures at constant prices also grew very much in line with their target values, and averaged 
to around 4.0 per cent as compared to the planned figure of 3.8 per cent (see Table 2). 
The high growth of output and the excessively high private consumption growth during 
the first three years of the Plan were primarily achieved through increased utilization of existing 
capacities and increased imports, particularly fmal consumer goods imports. The imports of 
goods and services rose from 13.5 billion dollars in 1989/90 to around 25 billion dollars in 
1991/92. According to the national income statistics, over the first three years of the Plan 
imports of goods and services at constant prices increased by an average annual rate of around 
28 per cent. Given Iran's limited capacity to export, these high levels of imports could not be 
sustained and led to a substantial deterioration of the country's external current account, and 
created important difficulties for the government in meeting the repayments of the economy's 
short-term debts, estimated to be around 18 to 20 billion dollars. (See below for more details). 
The financing difficulties and foreign exchange shortages once again presented the government 
with two opposing policy choices: a freely floating exchange rate accompanied with strict 
control of private and government credits, or a reversion to a policy of trade restrictions and 
foreign exchange controls. The indications are that the latter option is now being followed. It 
is, however, important to note that both policy options have similar short-term consequences for 
the real economy and lead to a curtailment of imports and a slow down in output growth. In fact 
imports have already begun to fall in real terms. In 1992/93 imports of goods and services at 
constant prices declined by 9.81 per cent as compared to a rise of 29.6 per cent in the preceding 
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year. Over the years 1993/94-1994/95 imports have continued to decline at an even sharper rate. 
The GDP growth is estimated to be only around 2.5 per cent in 1993/94, and is likely to be even 
lower in the coming year. 
Trends in Monetary and Inflation 
In addition to output, consumption and investment targets, the First Plan also stipulated 
upper bounds on the average rate of monetary growth and the inflation rate. The plan was to 
limit the rate of expansion of the total private sector liquidity (namely the M2 measure of money 
supply) to an annual average rate of 9.4 per cent, and the rate of increase of the index of retail 
prices to an annual average rate of 15.7 per cent.5 However, as can be seen from Table 3, 
money supply (the M2 measure) grew by an annual average rate of 25.2 per cent, thus 
substantially exceeding the Plan's target. The M1 measure of money supply grew slightly less 
at around 23.8 per cent, mainly reflecting the move from cash and non-interest paying deposits 
to term-investment deposits paying returns of between 7 to 15 per cent per annum.6 The index 
of retail prices rose by an annual average rate of 18.8 percent during the Plan, which was much 
to the Plan's target of 15.7 percent. However, it is important to note that due to direct and 
indirect government subsidies on essential food stuffs, energy and transportation, the index of 
retail prices does not fully reflect the extent of inflationary pressures that have been present in 
the economy over the past 5 years. A more appropriate overall measure of inflation is the rate 
of change of the implicit deflator of the Gross Domestic Product. According to this measure the 
average rate of inflation over the Plan has been around 25.3 per cent, which is substantially 
higher the rate of increase in the retail price index.7 This discrepancy is, however, of short-term 
nature and largely reflects the time delays involved in the transmission of inflationary pressures 
to the final goods prices, and the fact that with the substantial depreciation of the exchange rate 
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the level of government subsidies (direct and indirect) on consumer goods have been rising; 
largely neutralizing the adverse effects of the devaluation on a number of essential commodities 
such as bread, fuel, water and electricity.8 But one would expect that in the long-run most of 
the excess of the inflation in the implicit GDP price deflator over the inflation in the retail price 
index to show itself in a higher rate of increase in the level of consumer prices in the future.9 
The Plan's overall monetary target of 9.4 per cent per annum, has clearly been out of line 
with economic realities. But more importantly, it has not even been consistent with the Plan's 
own inflation target of 15.7 per cent per annum. In a developing economy such as Iran, one 
would expect the money supply growth to exceed the inflation rate and not vice versa. This is 
confirmed by the price and money supply data given in Table 3. Over the period 1979/80- 
1993/1994, the average annual growth of money supply exceeded the growth of retail prices by 
2.9 per cent, and that of the GDP price deflator by 2.0 per cent. A similar result also follows if 
attention is confined to the period after the revolution and before the start of the First Plan. Over 
the period 1979/80-1988/89, money supply (M2) and the index of the retail prices grew by annual 
average rates of 20.1 and 19.0 per cents, respectively. The smaller rate of increase in the real 
mqney balances (the difference between the money supply growth and the inflation rate) over 
this period is largely explained by the negative output growth experienced during the period. 
It is, however, important to note that the revolution seems to have significantly affected the 
relationship between money supply growth, output and inflation which could have important 
consequences for the efficacy of monetary policy in relation to the control of inflation. The 
income elasticity of demand for money appears to have declined from around 1.83 before the 
revolution to around 0.41 after the revolution. This suggests that the same rate of expansion in 
private sector liquidity is likely to have more inflationary consequences after than before the 
revolution. The low income elasticity of demand for money after the revolution is also indicative 
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of the serious inefficiencies that exist in the banking sector.10 
Another important feature of the trends shown in Table 3 is the rate at which money 
supply growth and inflation have been accelerating over the last two years of the Plan. The 
growth of money supply (the M2 measure) has increased from about 25 per cent in 1992/93 to 
over 34 per cent in 1993/94. Similarly, the index of the retail prices has increased from 20 per 
cent in 199 1/92 to 22 per cent in 1992/93, and then to 26.3 per cent in 1993/94. The pattern of 
price changes based on GDP deflator over these three years is even more striking and shows a 
rise in the rate of inflation from 23.6 in 1991/2 to 37.1 per cent in 1993/94. The more recent 
data covering the first half of 1994/95, also suggest that these rising trends in money supply 
growth and inflation are continuing unabated." The acceleration in the rate of inflation, not 
surprisingly, has been associated with acceleration in the rate of money supply growth. Figure 
1 shows the close association that has existed between growth of money supply and inflation 
over the post-revolutionary period. 
The factors contributing to the growth of the private sector liquidity are, however, highly 
complex and in the case of Iran involve an important political thmension. Given the rather 
unçler-developed nature of the capital and bond markets in Iran, almost all financing needs of the 
public and the private sectors are met through the banking system. Therefore, the expansion of 
credit to the private and the public sectors are among the most important driving forces behind 
money supply growth, and hence inflation.12 The annual rates of change of the private and the 
public sector indebtedness to the banking system are given in Table 3. Over the post revolution 
period the indebtedness of the private and the public sectors to the banking system have 
increased by annual average rates of 19.7 and 24 per cents, respectively, as compared to an 
average annual rate of 21.8 per cent for the money supply growth. The corresponding figures 
over the duration of the Plan are, respectively, 32.7, 20.5, and 25.2 per cents.'3 At first it 
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appears that advances to the private sector are largely to be blamed for the excessive expansion 
of the liquidity over the past five years. But a closer examination of the annual growth rates in 
Table 3 reveals a highly uneven expansion of credits to the private and public sectors. The rate 
of growth of private sector credit peaked in 1991/92, while the growth in public sector credit was 
successfully controlled at around 9.6 to 12.7 per cents over the first four years of the Plan, but 
shot up to 59.7 per cent in 1993/94. This uneven pattern is closely related to the pace and timing 
of government liberalization and exchange rate unification policy. The 39.1 per cent rise in 
private sector credit in 199 1/92 was a direct consequence of the removal of the credit ceilings 
and the application of the floating exchange rate to a wider class of private sector imports. The 
effect of the exchange rate depreciation on public sector borrowing requirements did not, 
however, fully become transparent due to substantial increases in government's rial revenues 
from the sales of foreign exchange at preferential rates in the free market.'4 But such increases 
in government revenues are short-lived and can only be maintained by a continual process of 
exchange rate depreciation which is clearly undesirable, as well as being ineffective in the long- 
run. Therefore, the public sector indebtedness to the banking sector is likely to show 
considerable growth over the next few years, unless concerted efforts are made to increase tax 
revenues substantially. Other possibilities for reducing the growth of public sector indebtedness 
to the banking system, such as reductions in growth of government expenditures, and greater 
control of the operations of public and semi-public corporations (such as the enterprises under 
the auspices of the Foundations for the Oppressed) also need to be considered, although they 
pose difficult political choices for the government. 
In the final analysis the main causes of the excessive monetary expansion has to be found 
in government's unwillingness to oppose credit demands of politically powerful groups (both 
inside and outside the government). In Iran these political considerations are more critical for 
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the conduct of monetary and credit policies, both because of the size and political importance 
of the semi-public enterprises, and the relatively non-responsive nature of interest rates to 
changes in the economy's inflationary environment. Under the Plan, actual "profit" rates paid 
on bank deposits have changed little in comparison to high and rising rates of inflation. For 
example, the highest actual return paid on five-year investment deposits was increased from 13 
per cent in 199 1/92 to 15 per cent in 1992/93, while the inflation rate (measured by the retail 
price index which registers the lowest rate of inflation) over this period rose from 20 to 22 per 
cents, respectively. Therefore, yielding negative ex post real rate of returns of 7 per cent per 
annum, while in view of economy's annual average growth of 7 percent and its long-run growth 
potential, one would have expected real rate of returns of around 3-4 per cent. This degree of 
"financial repression" inevitably have undesirable consequences for the mobilization of domestic 
savings, encourages capital flight, and promotes speculative activities, particularly in real estate 
and foreign currencies.15 The bank's lending rates were also well below the rate of inflation 
and ranged from 9 to 13 per cent in 1992/93; thus increasing demand for bank credits, which 
coupled with the removal of credit ceilings in 199 1/92, led to excess increases in private sector 
indebtedness discussed above. Over the past year there has been further increases in the bank's 
lending rates, but despite these increases bank's lending rates (even for commercial loans) are 
still substantially below the rate of inflation. There is an obvious tendency for increases in 
interest rates to systematically lag behind the rises in the inflation rate, thus maintaining high 
negative real interest rates, albeit at higher and higher nominal interest rates. These 
developments clearly highlight the dangers of piece-meal reforms of the financial sector. 
Abolition of credit ceilings and other restrictions on bank credits would be desirable and 
effective only if accompanied by (profit) rates on deposits and bank lending rates that are 
responsive to market forces and fully reflect the inflationary expectations that are present in the 
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economy. An effective policy of fmancial liberalization also requires a competitive banking 
system where the lending policies of the banks are based on commercial considerations rather 
than on political factors. 
Trade Liberalization and Exchange Rate Unification 
One of the major objectives of the First Five-Year Plan was to rationalize the foreign 
exchange market, promote non-oil exports and achieve a more efficient allocation of foreign 
exchange resources. Rigid adherence to a fixed official exchange rate during most of the 1980's, 
where the economy had been subject to a number of large negative shocks accompanied by 
relatively high domestic inflationary pressures, had resulted in a highly overvalued currency. 
The overvaluation of the official exchange rate became particularly serious over the latter half 
of the 1980's, and led to substantial premiums on the black market rate. The premium rose from 
200-300 per cent in the early 1980's to 500-600 per cent by mid 1980's and then reached 
phenomenal rates of over 2000 per cent by 1989. The existence of these enormous premiums 
introduced gross distortions in relative prices, encouraged rent-seeking at the expense of 
productive activities, and masked large government subsidies to consumers and producers with 
easy access to the country's foreign exchange earnings at the official rate.16 With income from 
oil exports dwindling and import requirements rising, particularly during the initial years of the 
Plan, rationalization of the foreign exchange market became a top economic priority. 
In 198 8/89, Iran's total foreign exchange receipts from goods exports at current prices 
amounted to 10.7 billion dollars which was less than half of Iran's foreign exchange receipts 
before the revolution. The fall in the country's foreign exchange revenues would be even more 
pronounced if one allows for increases in import prices over the period and Iran's rising 
population. Per capita foreign exchange revenues from oil exports measured in constant 1978 
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dollar prices has shrunk from $500 in 1978/79 to $110 in 1988/89, namely less than a quarter of 
its value before the revolution. Nevertheless, exports of oil and gas still accounted for the bulk 
of the foreign exchange receipts, with non-oil exports amounting to around 1 billion dollars. (See 
Table 4). Furthermore, it was not expected that oil exports could be expanded significantly, due 
both to limited production capacities and the rapidly rising domestic oil consumption, largely 
brought about by artificially low, and in real terms declining domestic energy prices. The oil 
production and oil export targets envisaged in the Plan have all been met. Under the Plan oil 
exports were to rise from around 1.99 million barrels per day (bid) in 1989/90 to 2.29 million 
b/d in 1993/94. As it turned out oil exports rose from 1.82 million b/d in 1989/90 to 2.40 million 
barrels in 1992193, thus over-shooting the Plan's target. However, due to lower than expected 
prices of oil exports over the last three years of the Plan, foreign exchange receipts from oil and 
gas exports have fallen short of their targets. This short fall amounted to 25 per cent for 1993/94, 
though for the whole Plan period it was only 7 per cent}7 
Faced with realities of capacity constraints on oil production and the vagaries of the 
international oil market, a large and increasing part of Plan's foreign exchange requirements had 
to be met from other sources, such as further increases in non-oil exports, a more efficient use 
of oil and gas revenues, and foreign borrowing. Reform of the foreign trade and exchange 
system was therefore essential for a successful implementation of the Plan. As the first step 
towards meeting this goal, in 1989/90 surrender requirements applicable to several non-oil 
exports were significantly reduced or eliminated, and a special "servic&' exchange rate of Rls 
845 = US$1 was introduced for certain payments by qualified individuals. The multitude of 
exchange rates in effect were replaced by three main rates: the "official" rate (Ris 70 = US$1), 
primarily applicable to foreign exchange transactions of the public sector, a "competitive" rate 
for certain essential private sector imports, and a "floating" rate for other approved private sector 
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imports.18 The proceeds from non-oil exports were allowed to be converted into rials at the 
preferential floating rate, an Export Development Bank for promotion of non-oil exports was 
founded in 1991/92, barter agreements were cancelled with a number of countries in the old 
Soviet Block, obligation on incoming passengers to declare the importation of foreign exchange 
for the equivalent of $5,000 was removed, and out-going passengers were permitted to export 
foreign currency up to the equivalent of $10,000 per person, lists of goods to be imported at the 
"competitive" and at the "floating" rates were gradually extended.19 Largely as a result of 
these policies, and the substantial increases in private and public sector credits, imports of goods 
and services more than doubled between 1988/89 and 1991/92, rising from $13.0 billion to $31.0 
billion. (See Table 4). Non-oil exports also responded vigorously to the favourable new 
economic climate and rose steadily from $1 billion in 1988/89 to $3.7 billion in 1993/94.20 
Despite these substantial increases in non-oil exports, because of stagnant oil and gas revenues, 
and in particular due to much higher than expected imports of goods and services, the current 
account of the balance of payments showed a deficit of $9.4 billion dollars in 1991/92, followed 
by a further current account deficit of $6.5 billion in 1992/93, and $4.2 billion in 1993/94. 
In spite of these large and continued balance of payments deficits, and the emerging 
evidence of government's difficulties with external debt repayments, the Central Bank of the 
Islamic Republic decided to go ahead with the next stage of its exchange rate unification policy 
and in April 1993 announced that from then on all private and public foreign exchange 
transactions (except for about $4 billion of government imports of essential commodities) would 
be conducted at a new "floating" rate, to be determined daily on the basis of the balance of 
supply and demand for foreign currency. Initially, the policy proved to be quite effective and 
the gap between the new "floating" rate used in bank transactions and the "free" market rate 
used for transactions outside the banking system virtually disappeared. From April to September 
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1993 the two rates differed by less than 0.5 per cent. But with deficits on balance of payments 
continuing, and evidence on the government's inability to meet its external debt mounting 
throughout the year, coupled with high and rising domestic inflation, the gap between the two 
rates started to widen in late October 1993; a trend which has continued ever since. In December 
1994, the free market rate for one US dollar stood at 2,680 rials and was some 50 per cent higher 
than the so-called "floating" rate, which has been kept unchanged at its level of 1,750 rials per 
US dollar since December 1993.21 In recent months another market ("black") has developed 
for foreign exchange, where one US dollar is being transacted at about 3,240 rials in mid January 
1995.22 Clearly, this constitutes an important reversal in the government's exchange rate 
unification policy, and if allowed to continue could jeopardise most of the reform policies that 
have so far been put into effect, and is likely to result in the repetition of the economic policy 
mistakes of the past 15 years. Any significant policy reversal at this stage is likely to lead to 
further political and economic uncertainties, with undesirable consequences for growth and 
inflation. It would also cast doubt on the feasibility of achieving the growth and inflation 
objectives of the Second Five-Year Economic Plan which has been recently approved by the 
Majlis.23 
The Second Five-Year Plan 
The Second Plan covers the period 1994/95-1998/99, but because of delays in its 
approval by the Majlis and the fmancial difficulties of the government its implementation has 
been delayed by one year and is to begin in March 1995. This Plan very much represents a 
continuation of the economic and social policies of the First Plan, and places considerable 
emphasis on macroeconomic stabilization programmes, and unification of exchange rate as 
important pre-requisites for attainment of the Plan's quantitative objectives.24 Two different 
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scenarios concerning the foreign exchange revenues from exports of oil and gas were considered 
in the Plan documents submitted by the government to the Majlis. Under the first scenario it was 
assumed that total foreign exchange revenues from oil and gas exports amounted to $69.3 billion, 
while under the second "high" income scenario, the total foreign exchange revenues from oil and 
gas exports were assumed to be $73.6, or higher by only 6 per cent over five-years. The GDP 
growth targets under these two scenarios were set at 5.4 and 5.9 per cents per annum. It was 
further assumed that the government budget would be balanced throughout the course of the 
Plan, a unified exchange rate policy would be in effect and the exchange rate would be 
detennined according to a system of managed float, the country's foreign liabilities would be 
reduced, and as compared to the First Plan, a larger share of the government budget would be 
allocated to development expenditures. 
Despite the prolonged period that the proposed plan has been under review, and the often 
heated debates that have surrounded its objectives and projections, what has now been finally 
approved by the Majlis differs only marginally from what had been originally submitted by the 
government. The GDP growth target is now set at 5.1 per cent per annum over the Plan's 
and is only slightly below the output growth targets envisaged in the proposed plan.25 
The approved Plan, however, places relatively greater emphasis on the development of the 
agricultural sector, largely at the expense of construction and service sectors. The sectoral 
average annual growth rates under the Plan are: 4.3 per cent for agriculture, 1.6 per cent for oil, 
5.9 per cent for industries and mines, 8.0 per cent for water, electricity and gas, 4.0 per cent for 
construction, 4.7 per cent for transportation, 6.8 per cent for communications, and 2.6 per cent 
for other services. These are much lower than the growth targets in the First Plan (given in Table 
1), and largely reflect the realities of Iran's limited capacity to produce oil for exports, expected 
weak international oil prices, and the government's aim of reducing the economy's dependence 
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on external financing. Under the Plan foreign exchange revenues from oil and non-oil exports 
is projected to be $100,185 million ($72,658 million from oil exports and $27,527 million from 
non-oil exports), while the total imports of goods and services are projected to amount to 
$91,979 million; thus leaving $8,206 million for the repayments of principle and interests on 
foreign loans. The Plan also stipulates that the country's total foreign indebtedness (whether 
short-term or long-term) should not exceed $25 billion in the final year of the Plan. 
2. In line with the reduced output growth, the Plan envisages real private 
consumption expenditures at constant 1982/1983 (1361) prices to grow at an annual average rate 
of 4.0 per cent, while reducing public consumption expenditures by an annual average rate of 
0.9 per cent, in real terms. In contrast, the Plan's target for growth of investment expenditures 
at constant prices is set at 6.2 per cent per annum. These growth rates clearly show the high 
priority given by the government to private consumption over government consumption, and to 
investment over consumption, and are in line with government objectives as manifested in the 
First Plan. (see Table 2). On a sectoral basis transportation, communication, oil and gas, and 
agricultural sectors have given the highest investment priorities. The average annual growth of 
investment expenditures at constant prices in these sectors are projected to be 10.5,9.4, 7.5 and 
7.2 percents, respectively. The projected investment growths in other sectors range between 4.3 
to 6.9 per cents, per annum. 
3. Expansion of non-oil exports has also been given a high priority in the plan, and 
it is assumed that under the Plan foreign exchange earnings from non-oil exports rise by an 
average annual rate of 8.4 per cent, as compared to an average annual growth of 3.4 per cent in 
foreign exchange revenues from oil exports. 
4. On the nominal side of the economy, the plan aims to bring down the annual 
growth of private sector liquidity and the rate of inflation to 12.5 and 12.4 percents, respectively. 
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It is also projected that with the tight control of government consumption expenditures it will be 
possible to limit the average annual growth of public sector indebtedness to the banking system 
to 3.8 per cent. The Plan also stipulates that 55 per cent of the total increase in bank credits 
should go to the private and the cooperative sectors of the economy. 
5. The level of subsidies paid for the consumption of essential commodities, comprising 
medicine, dried milk, wheat, rice, cooking oil, sugar and cheese, are to be kept at their 1993/94 
(1372) levels in US dollars. This will in effect prevent the prices of essential food items and 
medicine to rise with inflation, and will result in further distortions in relative prices. The Plan 
also addresses the problem of large implicit subsidies on domestic energy consumption, and 
sanctions limited increases in domestic prices of energy products, which is a welcome first step 
in the right direction, although it may be too little, too late!26 
In addition to these quantitative targets, the Plan pays special attention to the 
development of product and capital markets, reform of the country's administrative system, 
improvements in income and wealth distributions, strengthening of the social security system 
by providing free medical and health insurance for the "vulnerable" groups in society, redirection 
of the government subsidy programme towards families with low incomes, and elimination of 
regional imbalances. The Plan also places important emphasis on a number of social and cultural 
objectives that lie outside the scope of the present paper. 
The output and investment growth targets seem plausible, and in the absence of major 
political upheavals, wars or other unpredictable crises seem quite feasible. The assumptions 
concerning oil production and oil prices are also plausible and if anything err on the side of 
caution and may turn out to be too pessimistic. The nominal targets set for the growth of the 
private sector liquidity and inflation seem much less plausible and are less likely to be achieved. 
As noted above, historically the growth of private sector liquidity has been higher than the rate 
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of inflation. Therefore, as with the First Plan, the money supply growth and inflation targets 
envisaged in the Second Plan do not seem to be consistent with historical realities. In this 
connection the planned change in the composition of the Money and Credit Council towards 
more political appointees is likely to make the task of controlling the private and public sector 
credits and inflation much more difficult.27 Similar qualifications also apply to the possibility 
of achieving targets set for government finances (namely balanced budgets), and the level of 
foreign indebtedness. 
Remarks 
After many years of revolutionary upheavals and wars, the First Five-Year Plan provided 
Mr. Ralsanjani's government with an important opportunity for regeneration of Iran's war- 
damaged and ailing economy. It also provided the government with a reasonably cohesive 
framework for the formulation and implementation of badly needed reforms of the trade and 
foreign exchange systems. The Plan's growth objectives were, however, rather ambitious and 
attempts at achieving them have led to substantial balance of payments deficits and, given Iran's 
unfavourable international position, have created serious external financing difficulties for the 
government. These developments have been further exacerbated by hasty and badly-timed 
moves towards unification of the exchange rate. In consequence, the pace of economic growth 
has slowed down considerably, inflation has reached new heights and is still rising, and the 
country is facing the daunting task of servicing and repaying large foreign debts. Faced with 
these difficulties, over the past year important steps have been taken by the government to 
stabilize the economy and alleviate the country's external financing difficulties. Foreign debts 
are being extended and in some cases even repaid. Foreign exchange expenditures are being 
reduced, foreign exchange receipts are increasing, and public expenditures are being moderated. 
17 
It is, however, important to note that these policies while essential for the stabilization of the 
economy, are likely to be at the expense of the real economy, and could lead to substantial loss 
of production and increased unemployment without necessarily resulting in a reduction of the 
inflation. It is therefore important that such stabilization policies are also accompanied by strict 
control of private and public sector credits. The control of the foreign exchange transactions, 
without an effective control of government expenditures and private sector credits are also likely 
to lead to a further widening of the gaps that exist among the various exchange rates that are 
currently in effect in Iran. Unless further steps are taken by the government to stabilize the 
money and foreign exchange markets, there is a real possibility that the structural reforms and 
liberalization policies of the past six years may come to a halt or even be reversed. But it seems 
highly unlikely that a return to the centralized and inward-looking economic policies of the 
1980's will provide the answer to Iran's mounting economic problems. 
18 
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11.6 13.7 5.7 7.9 3.8 4.0 
Sources: Actual growth rates are from the Bank Markazi Jomhouri Islami Iran, and are computed 
from the national income statistics at constant 198211983 (1361) prices. The figures for 1993/94 are 
preliminary. The planned growth rates are from Iran Centre for Statistics, Plan and Budget Organization, 




Trends in Monetary A2gregates and Inflation in Iran 



















1979/80 (1358) 34.7 37.7 17.2 44.2 11.4 27.0 
1980/81 (1359) 32.3 27.0 18.8 60.3 23.5 23.4 
1981/82 (1360) 22.9 16.2 5.2 26.6 22.8 24.5 
1982/83 (1361) 28.7 22.8 8.2 23.9 20.3 14.6 
1983/84 (1362) 11.1 16.9 22.1 18.0 14.8 12.3 
1984/85 (1363) 17.8 6.0 5.7 14.9 10.4 10.1 
1985/86 (1364) 8.1 13.0 12.9 8.3 6.9 4.7 
1986/87 (1365) 18.1 19.1 9.8 23.6 23.7 13.2 
1987/88 (1366) 16.6 18.1 13.8 16.7 27.7 22.9 
1988/89 (1367) 14.5 23.8 17.8 20.2 28.9 17.0 
1989/90 (1368) 15.8 19.5 29.7 10.8 17.4 19.3 
1990/91 (1369) 24.6 22.5 35.7 9.6 9.0 18.6 
1991/92 (1370) 21.8 24.6 39.1 9.7 19.6 23.6 
1992/93 (1371) 20.0 25.3 28.9 12.8 21.6 27.9 
1993/94 (1372) 36.9 34.2 29.9 59.7 26.3 37.1 
Sources: Bank Markazi Jomhouri Islami Iran, various publications. 
1. Private sector debt to the banking system. 
2. Public sector debt to the banking system. 
3. Implicit price deflator of Gross Domestic product at market prices, 




Balance of Payments 













Trade Balance -367 975 -6,529 -3,406 -1,207 
Exports 10,709 13,081 19,305 18,661 19,868 18,080 
Oil and Gas (9,673) (12,037) (17,993) (16,012) (16,880) (14,333) 
Others (1,036) (1,044) (1,312) (2,649) (2,988) (3,747) 
Imports (FOB) -10,608 -13,448 -18.330 -25,190 -23,274 -19,287 
Services -1,970 -2,324 -3,148 -4,919 -5,094 -4,486 
Receipts 467 798 892 881 846 1,257 
Payments -2,437 -3,122 -4,040 -5,800 -5,940 -5,743 
Transfers - 2,500 2,500 2,000 1,996 1,500 
Current Balance -1,869 -191 327 -9,448 -6,504 -4,193 
Sources: Annual Reviews, 1991/92 (1370) and 1992/93 (1371), Bank Markazi Jomhouri 
Islami Iran. Figures for the years 1992/93 and 1993/94 take account of 
the most recent revisions made by the Bank Markazi, but should still be 
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A two-year weighted average 
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1. The real output is measured by the Gross Domestic Product at market prices, the real investment is 
measured by the Gross Fixed Capital Formation. All figures are in 1982/1982(1361) constant prices, and 
are obtained from the Bank Markazi Joinhouri Islaini Iran. 
2. For a more detailed account of the economic conditions during this period see, for example, Pesaran, 
M.H., "The System of Dependent Capitalism in Pre- and Post-Revolutionary ban", International Journal 
of Middle East Studies, 1982,14, PP. 501-22; Pesaran, M.H., "Economic Development and Revolutionary 
Upheavals in Iran", in H. Afshar (ed.), Iran: A Revolution in Turmoil, London, Macmillan 1985; Behdad, 
S., "Foreign Exchange Gap, Structural Constraints, and the Political Economy of Exchange Rate 
determination in Iran", International Journal of Middle East Studies, 1988; Amirahmadi, Revolution and 
Economic transition: The Iranian Albany State University of New York Press, 1990; 
Amuzegar, J. Iran's Economy under the Islamic Republic, London, LB. Tauris, 1993; Mazarei, Jr., A., 
"The Iranian Economy Under the Islamic Republic: Institutional Change and Macroeconomic 
Performance, 1979-1990", Cambridge Journal of Economics. 1995 (forthcoming). 
3. Also see "An Evaluation of the Performance of the Country's Real Economy in 1992/93" (Arzyabi 
amalkard bakhshe vaghaie eghtesadi keshvar dar sal 1371), Department of Economic Bank 
Markazi Jomhouri Islam! Iran, Mordad, 1372. Note that the target and realized growth rates given in this 
publication refer to the first four years of the Plan. Also the GDP figures at constant prices published by 
the Bank Markazi include an adjustment for the changes in the terms of trade, while our figures do not. 
4. The differences in year-to-year movements of planned and actual growth rates also demonstrate the 
difficulties surrounding planning/forecasting of annual changes in sectoral output in an economy such 
as Iran where it is still highly dependent on the developments in volatile international oil markets, and 
raises serious doubts about the utility of detailed sectoral planning in Iran. 
5. TheM2 measure is defined as the sum of money (theM1 measure) and quasi-money. TheM1 measure 
is defined as notes and coins in circulation plus sight deposits of the private sector with the banking 
system. Quasi-money is defined as the sum of time and saving deposits of the private sector with the 
banking system. 
6. Under the arrangement of Islamic banldng, interest paying deposits with the banking system are 
viewed as participation in the investment activities of the banking system. Such deposits are subject to 
two (profit) rates. An initial rate, known as the "provisional" (al-al-hessab) rate which is announced at 
the time deposits are placed with the banks; and a final or actual rate which is computed on the basis of 
the bank's operations at the end of the year. However, in practice the provisional and actual returns are 
very close. For example, the provisional and actual "profit rates" on investment deposits of different 
durations in 1992/93 (1371) were as follows: 
Deposits Provisional Actual 
Short-term 7.0 7.5 
One-year 9.5 10.0 
Two-year 11.0 11.5 
Three-year 11.25 13.0 
Five-year 14.5 15.0 
Source: Annual Review. 1992/93 (1371), Bank Markazi Jomhouri Islam! Iran. 
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7. A similar discrepancy also exists between the rate of change of the wholesale and the retail price 
indices. Under the Plan the wholesale price index rose by an annual average rate of 25.5 percent, as 
compared to the average annual rate of change of the retail prices of 18.8 per cent. Also note that the rate 
of increase of the wholesale prices almost exactly match the rate of change of the GDP deflator over the 
Plan. 
8.For a discussion of the extent of government subsidies on bread and energy see M. Karshenas and M. 
Hashem Pesaran, "Economic Reform and the Reconstruction of the Iranian Economy", The Middle East 
JournaL 1995 (forthcoming). 
9. Historically, the average rate of increase of the three main general price indices, namely the retail price 
index, the wholesale price index and the implicit price deflator of GDP, have all been of the same order 
of magnitudes. For example, the averages of these indices (per cent per annum) over the pre- and post- 
revolution periods have been as follows: 
Different Sub-periods 
1959/60-1978/79 1979/80-1993/94 1959/60-1993/94 
Retail prices 6.72 18.93 11.95 
Wholesale prices 5.34 20.69 11.92 
GDP Implicit 7.49 19.74 12.89 
Deflator 
(at market prices) 
10. Using annual observations on real money balances, output and inflation we obtained the 
following estimates: 
Pre-Revolution: 1960-1978 
= —2.29 + 0.715 + 0.521 — 
(—3.98) (7.85) (3.75) (—6.10) 
= 0.997, = 0.044, = 0.16, 
where figures in brackets are t-ratios, is adjusted squared multiple correlation coefficient, ô is the 
standard error of the regression, is the chi-squared statistic with one degree of freedom for tests 
of the residual serial correlation, 
M2 = The broad definition of money supply 
P = Implicit price deflator of GDP at market prices 
V = GDP at constant 1982/83 (1351) prices 
iMogP = Inflation rate used as a proxy for the nominal interest rate 
This regression implies a long-run income elasticity of demand for money of around 1.83 [0.134]. The 
figure in square brackets is the standard error of the estimate. This estimate is robust to the possibility 
of unit roots in real money balances, output and inflation. See, Shin and Pesaran, New Estimation and 
Asymptotic Results for Autoregressive Distributed Lag Models with Stochastic and/or Deterministic 
Trends, 1995, Unpublished manuscript, Cambridge University. 
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Estimating the same equation over the period after the revolution (namely 1979-1993) yielded: 
= 1.481 + 0.715 log(M2/P)1_1 + 0.116 logY1 — 0.208A LogP, 
(1.35) (4.49) (1.08) (—1.18) 
12=0755 à=0.042, 
The long-run income elasticity of demand for money implied by this regression is only 0.408(0.296), and 
is much less precisely estimated than the one obtained for the period before the revolution. Notice that 
in both regressions the inflation variable has the correct sign; indicating that a rise in inflation has the 
desired dampening effect on the demand for real money balances. But once again the quantitative effect 
of inn ation on demand for real money balances seems to have declined substantially after the revolution. 
11. During the first six months of 1994/95 (1373), the average monthly index of retail prices has risen 
by 30.9 per cent as compared to the average value of the index over the first six months of 1993/94 
(1372). Source: Price Index of Consumer Goods and Services in Urban 1373. Bank 
Markazi Jomhouri Islami han. 
12. Another important of source money supply growth is the non-neutralized part of increases in the 
country's foreign exchange reserves. This factor has not, however, been very important over the period 
under consideration. 
13. A simple regression of money supply growth on the growth of the public and private sector 
indebtedness to the banking system estimated over the period 1979/80 - 1993/94 yields 
Y = 7.066 + 0.311 X1 + 0.369 X2, 
(3.390) (0.122) (0.077) 
DW= 1.95, 
where Y denotes the percentage growth in money supply (the M2 measure), and X1 and X2 are, 
respectively, the percentage growth of the private and public sector indebtedness to the banking system. 
The figures in brackets are standard errors of the estimates, R2 is the adjusted squared multiple correlation 
coefficient, DW is the Durbin-Watson statistics, and is the standard error of the regression. 
14. For instance, 41 per cent of total government revenues in 1992193 originated from the sale of foreign 
exchange at preferential rates. See Annual Review, Bank Markazi Jomliouri Islami Iran, 1992/93. 
15. See Annual Reviews for the years 199 1/92 and 1992/93, and Table 3. 
16. See, Lautenschlager, W., "The Effects of an Overvalued Exchange Rate on the Iranian Economy, 
1979-1989", International Journal of Middle East Studies, 1986, 18, pp. 31-52; Behdad, S., "Foreign 
Exchange Gap Structural Constraints and the Political Economy of Exchange Rate Determination in 
Iran", International Journal of Middle East 1988, 20, pp. 1-21; and Pesaran, M.H. "The Iranian 
Foreign Exchange Rate Policy and the Black Market for Dollars", International Journal of Middle East 
Studies, 1992, 24, pp. 101-25. 
17. The Planned target for foreign exchange receipts from the oil and gas sector was $19.2 billion 
for the year 1993/94, and $83.1 billion for the whole five-year period. 
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18. In 1992/93, out of the total foreign exchange allocation of $23.2 billion, $12.1 billion was done at the 
official rate, $4.2 billion at the competitive rate, and $6.9 billion at the floating rate. l'his allocation 
brought the share of foreign exchange allocated at the official rate to 52 per cent, down from 71 per cent 
in 1991/92. (see Annual 1992193). 
19. See Annual Report and Balance Sheet, Bank Markazi Jomhouri Islami Iran, 1991/92(1370), Chapter 
9. 
20. Notice, however, that foreign exchange revenues from non-oil exports still fell about 34 percent 
below the planned target of $17.8 for the whole Plan period. 
21. See Table 2 in M. Karshenas and M. Hashem Pesaran, "Economic Reform and the Reconstruction 
of the Iranian The Middle East JournaL 1995 (forthcoming). 
22. Currently there are in fact four different exchange rates in Iran. The "floating" rate which is 
applicable to the transactions through the banking system, a special export rate applicable to non-oil 
export proceeds, the "free" market rate for transactions through the recognized foreign exchange dealers 
outside the banking system, and the "black" market rate primarily used in capital transactions. In mid 
January 1995 (28, Bahman, 1373) these rates were respectively equal to 1,750, 2,345, 2,680 and 3,240 
rials per one US dollar. Source: International Institute for Trade Relation Promotion, Tehran. 
23.The Second Five-Year Plan was approved by the Majlis and ratified by the Council of Guardians in 
December 1994 (on 20th of Aban 1373 in the Iranian calender). 
24. See the documentations of the Second Plan for Economic. Social and Cultural Development of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran, Volumes 1-5, Plan and Budget Organization, Islamic Republic of Iran. Azar 
1372 (1993/94). In particular, see the annex to the plan documents submitted by the government to the 
Majlis. (Peyvast Layeh Barnameb Duvom). 
25. See the Law of the Second Five-Year Economic, Social and Cultural Plan of the Islamic Republic of 
The Official Newspaper of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Volume 50, Number l4515,( 8/10/1 373). 
26. For a discussion of the food and energy subsidies in Iran see M. Karshenas and M. Hashem Pesaran, 
"Economic Reform and the Reconstruction of the Iranian Economy", The Middle East JournaL 1995 
(forthcoming). 
27. The membership of the Money and Credit Council that overseas the conduct of monetary policy in 
Iran is amended and now includes the Minister of Economic Affairs and Finance, The Head of the Plan 
and Budget Organization, the Governor of the Central Bank, and two other ministers. Out of the 
remaining 4 members only one is to be an expert in money and banking matters. This new membership 
of the Council represents an important move towards further politicization of the lending activities of the 
Central Bank, with undesirable consequences for the Bank's ability to control total private sector liquidity 
and inflation. 
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The Economic Research Forum for the Arab Countries, Iran and Turkey (ERF) was established in 
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